Thursday, August 31, 2006

Download First Georgian Web Toolbar !!!

I enjoy it very much!!! You can get news about georgia integrated right in your toolbar, listen to all georgian radios (the first precedent I know), watch georgian tv and thats not all, you can find german, english dictionaries to georgian and vice versa and georgian language support for Lingvo!!!
Search in georgian search sites and I am still discovering features!!!

As I understood this toolbar is licensed with Google. The only thing I didn't like,are some links to georgian religion websites... it just does not blend with a such kind of toolbars, but well its still worth to download it!!!

download it!!!

Wednesday, August 30, 2006

Georgians leaving Abkhazia in september 1993




Note: Video contains some hard scenes!!!

Russian Boevik recounts Fightings in Abkhazia




Livejournal about Sukhumi: pictures, memories and dreams about going back...



Translation from russian:

I arrived in Abkhazia in spring of 1993. It was my own will, because I thought that fighting for tiny people of Abkhazia was right thing to do, but I was wrong... with us mainly fought russians and armenians, abkhazians were few - about 20%. I did not like when Cossacks shot priest straight in the church only, because he did not say, that this land was abkhazians, instead of that he said that: ,,this land belongs to God,,. They spread rumour that he said it was georgian land, but its not true, I was there. Other priest was hanged and several nuns were shot.... One Abkhaz shot his 70 years old teacher only because he was teaching him georgian language in school... Right after taking Sukhumi, in Gudauta on the russian base ,,Bombora,, they brought 12-15 years old nude girls in exchange for Benzin... Yes, I regret that I participated in this war.

Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Anthem of the National Footbal Team Released

GGF.ge

Georgian Footbal Federation


The song was recorded in July 2006 in Tbilisi, Georgia. Music and Lyrics by Achiko Guledani (Mtsvane Otaxi), Beqa Jafaridze(Mtsvane Otaxi), Vakho Babunashvili (Soft Eject). Singer: Dato Lomidze (The String)

Official version

Pop version

Disco version

Lyrical version


Source: Muzorama

Migration

Migration


Source: Caucasus Research Resource Centers

Foreign Direct Investments in Georgia 1996-2006

1000 USD

1. US 581,165.20
2. UK 354,922.60
3. Azerbaijan 198,169.70
4. Russia 189,540.90
5. Turkey 179,983.50
6. Cyprus 103,169.00
7. Norway 99,693.50
8. Austria 97,225.00
9. Italy 93,085.10
10. Australia 84,924.80
11. France 78,978.00
12. the Virgin Islands 74,452.90
13. Japan 49,756.00
14. Korea 47,987.30
15. Germany 43,138.70
16 China 37,878.9
17 Greece 28,180.60
18 Ireland 15,741.90
19 Kazakhstan 11,774.50
20 Netherlands 7,146.70
21 Poland 9,168.60
22 Israel 9,988.90
23 Ukraineა 5,881.90
24 Saudi Arabia 4,982.10
25 Bulgaria 4,759.30
26 Czech Republic 2,902.6
25 Libya 2,646.10
28 Luxemburg 1,532.40
29 Armenia 1,003.20
30 Switzerland 988.50
31 United Arab Emirates 914.8
32 India 870.10
33 Hungary 603.20
34 Gibraltar 529.80
35 Belize 456.60
36 Denmark 451.60
37 Sweden 394.00
38 Argentine 118.1

Total 2,425,107


Source: GBC

Saturday, August 26, 2006

Abkhazia-Georgia relations in 1992-93



Source: Rustavi 2 - GAGUA Pro



Abkhazia News

Radio SOMA from Abkhazia

Die Wahrheit über Abchasien

Thursday, August 24, 2006

North and Hayek

Author: D. Khantadze

Doch aus den zahllosen bescheidenen Schritten, die von namenlosen Personen getan werden, wenn sie ihre gewohnten Aufgaben unter geänderten Umständen durchführen, entstehen die Vorbilder, die sich durchsetzen. Sie sind ebenso wichtig wie die großen intellektuellen Neuerungen, die klar als solche erkannt werden.


Friedrich A. von Hayek



1) Einleitung

Es können drei Arten von Problemen unterschieden werden, zu deren Lösung Wettbewerb als effektiver Mechanismus vom Nutzen sein kann: Anreiz-, Macht- und Wissensproblem.1 Da gesagt werden kann, dass der Wettbewerb immer stattfindet, sind für das Bestehen der wünschenswerten Wettbewerbsordnung die Regeln entscheidend, unter denen der Wettbewerb abläuft. In diesem Sinne kann unter der Systemtransformation der Übergang von einer ineffizienten Regelordnung zu einer zweckmäßigeren Regelordnung für Wettbewerb verstanden werden. Als Kriterium für die Beurteilung der Effizienz der Regeln für die Wirtschaft gilt die Konsumentensouveränität, die besagt, dass der Erfolg im Marktprozess nur durch eine bessere Befriedigung der Konsumenteninteressen erreicht werden soll („Leistungswettbewerb“). In der ordnungsökonomischen Sprache ausgedrückt, handelt es sich um den Unterschied zwischen „Rechtsordnung und Handelnsordnung“ (Hayek 1969): Dadurch wird betont, dass die Leistungsmerkmale der bestehenden Handelnsordnung (Marktsystem) von der bestehenden Rechtsordnung (Institutionen) abhängig sind.

Für Douglass North sind die in einer Gesellschaft bestehenden Institutionen Hauptbestimmungsfaktor der Leistungsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft (North 2005, 48). North hat sich eingehend in zahlreichen Beiträgen mit der Problematik der divergenten Entwicklung der Institutionen beschäftigt. Im Folgenden (Teil 2) wird sein letzter Beitrag (North 2005) dargestellt, in dem er die Ansätze für Verständnis des wirtschaftlichen Wandels vorstellt.2 Danach (Teil 3) sollen Norths Erkenntnisse mit der Theorie der kulturellen Evolution von F.A. von Hayek in Verbindung gebracht werden, um zu fragen, welche Schlussfolgerungen sich daraus für ordnungspolitische Gestaltung ergeben könnten.


2. Norths Verständnis des wirtschaftlichen Wandels

Die Hauptschwierigkeit für den Menschen besteht nach North darin, mit dem „wahren Neuen“ umzugehen. Die Unvorhersehbarkeit der Welt wirft die Frage auf, wie die Anpassung an die sich ständig ändernde Umwelt sichergestellt werden kann. Norths Arbeit lässt sich in zwei Teile gliedern: 1) Entscheidungs- bzw. Erkenntnistheorie – North geht der Frage nach, wie die Menschen Entscheidungen treffen; dabei werden von North zwei Problembereiche identifiziert: die Entscheidungen werden unter Unsicherheit getroffen; die mentalen Modelle haben die Funktion, die Unsicherheit zu verringern. 2) Theorie des institutionellen Wandels: Erklärungsinteresse liegt darin, zu untersuchen, wie die in einer Gesellschaft bestehenden Institutionen vor dem Hintergrund der bestehenden mentalen Modelle geändert werden.

2.1. Norths Entscheidungstheorie

North betont, dass Menschen Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit treffen. Diese Entscheidungen werden nach ihm von mentalen Modellen beeinflusst, die ihrerseits durch Glaubenssysteme bestimmt sind. „As soon as we realize that we always have an imperfect grasp of „reality“ and frequently have contrasting and conflicting views of the human landscape, we can begin to get a handle on the process of human change. The process works as follows: the beliefs that humans hold determine the choices they make that, in turn, structure the changes in the human landscape” (North 2005, 23). Daher ist sein Interesse dem Zusammenhang zwischen kognitiven Prozessen, Glaubensformation und Institutionen gerichtet (North 2005, 25).

Norths Erkenntnistheorie ähnelt der von Hayek, indem North Erkenntnis als Klassifikation der Objekte versteht, die durch aus Kategorien bestehende Struktur ermöglicht wird. Das Lernen erfolgt durch Erfahrung, die durch Rückkopplungsprozesse entweder zur Modifikation der Kategorien und Modelle oder zu deren Verstärkung führen kann (North 2005, 25).

Mit Hilfe seiner Erkenntnistheorie will North zeigen, wie schwierig es ist, korrekte Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit zu haben. Die unterschiedlichen Umweltbedingungen führten zu unterschiedlichen religiösen Vorstellungen, dessen Folge unterschiedliche mentale Modelle waren. Dadurch erklärt North unterschiedliche kulturelle Traditionen. Das ist sofern für North von Bedeutung, weil die menschliche Wahrnehmung in Kultur, Kontext und Geschichte eingebettet ist.3

Die Erörterung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen stellt für North aber die Vorarbeit dar, weil sein Hauptinteresse in die Erklärung des institutionellen Wandels besteht.

2.2. Norths Theorie des institutionellen Wandels

Institutionen definiert North als Beschränkungen, die von Menschen auf zwischenmenschliche Interaktionen auferlegt werden. „Those constraints (institutions) (together with standard constraints of economics) define the opportunity set in the economy“(North 2005, 59). Zwischen Institutionen und Glaubenssystemen wird folgende Beziehung angenommen: Glaubenssysteme stellen interne Repräsentation der menschlichen Umwelt dar. Bei Institutionen handelt es sich demgegenüber um Strukturen, die Menschen der eigenen Umgebung auferlegen, um gewünschte Ergebnisse zu erzielen. Die Änderung der Institutionen wird von Organisationen herbeigeführt. Damit will North auf die Glaubenssysteme derjenigen Organisationen aufmerksam machen, die imstande sind, die Institutionen zu gestalten. „Thus the structure of an economic market reflects the beliefs of those in a position to make the rules of the game, who enact rules that will produce the outcomes (that is, the sort of market) they desire, whether those desires are to create monopoly or to create a competitive market (always with the caveat that their beliefs may be incorrect and produce unanticipated consequences)” (North 2005, 50). Es sind die Vorstellungen und Ideen der Organisationen, die die Macht haben, Institutionen zu verändern, die bestimmen werden, ob ein Umverteilungs- oder produktives Spiel gespielt wird (North 2005, 63).

Nach North hängt die Antwort auf die Frage, warum einige Länder arm und andere reich sind, unmittelbar mit der Fragestellung zusammen, ob die jeweilige Gesellschaft die Annahme solcher Institutionen geschafft hat, die den unpersönlichen Tausch ermöglichen. Für ihn besteht der Gegensatz zwischen den Institutionen des persönlichen und unpersönlichen Tausches. Dieser Gegensatz ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Menschen ihre Dispositionen während des millionenjährigen Zusammenlebens in Jäger- und Sammlergruppen herausgebildet haben. Diese Dispositionen stellen vor allem aber Anpassung an die physische Umwelt dar. Daher fragt North nach Konsequenzen, die sich bei dem Versuch des Menschen ergeben, sich an die Probleme anzupassen, die von der menschlichen Umwelt ergeben. „Personal exchange by its very nature restricts the range of economic activity to clientism and repeated face-to-face interaction. Impersonal exchange entails a host of political, social, and economic institutions that ‘violate’ the innate genetic predispositions that evolved in the several million years of hunter/gatherer environments” (North 2005, S. 71). Der Übergang, der zu vollziehen ist, und den, wie North behauptet, bis dato nicht alle Gesellschaften durchgezogen haben, wird von Abraham und Platteau (2002, 26) folgendermaßen beschrieben: „What is required is a shift from a status-based and coercive society that relies on mutual control, respect of ranks, and strictly enforced codes of generosity, to an open society where free entry and exit, democratic governance (including acceptance of dissent), competence criteria, and socio-economic differentiation are used as guiding principles or expressly allowed to operate.”4 Den Vorteil der westlichen Welt sieht North in der Tatsache, dass es die Institutionen des unpersönlichen Tausches entwickeln konnte (North 2005, 100). Der Übergang vom persönlichen zum unpersönlichen Tausch impliziert auch, dass die Wirtschaft nicht als Nullsummenspiel, sondern als Positivsummenspiel wahrgenommen wird und ist entscheidender Punkt im Prozess des wirtschaftlichen Wandels (North 2005, 63).

North entwickelt somit sein Schema (beliefs → institutions → organizations → policies → outcomes) des wirtschaftlichen Wandels, in dem vor allem die Rolle von Organisationen betont wird: Organisationen sind es einerseits, die den institutionellen Wandel durchführen und andererseits sind es auch wiederum Organisationen, die an Erhaltung der bestehenden Institutionen interessiert sind und somit den Wandel verhindern (North 2005, 51).

Aufgrund seiner positiven Analyse des wirtschaftlichen Wandels kommt North eher zur pessimistischen Schlussfolgerung, die einzige Alternative bestehe darin, das Land, das über „formal and informal consensual political institutions“ (North 2005, 164) nicht verfügt, entweder einem wohlwollenden Diktator zu überantworten oder den NROs zu überlassen, was allerdings ein langwieriger Prozess des Lernens sein werde. Die normativen Schlussfolgerungen fallen bei North zu kurz und es erscheint lohnend zu sein, mit diesen Problemen aus ordnungsökonomischer Perspektive zu beschäftigen. Im Folgenden wird aber versucht, zu klären in welchem Verhältnis Norths Ansatz zu Hayeks Theorie der kulturellen Evolution steht.

3. Theorie der kulturellen Evolution und Wissensproblem

Im Folgenden soll auf die Rolle der (religiösen) Glaubenssysteme eingegangen werden, weil North darin einer der Hauptursachen der wirtschaftlichen Stagnation sieht. „Problems posed by the transition of a belief system from one constructed to deal with the physical environment to one constructed to confront the complex problems of the human environment are at the core of the problems of economic development” (North 2005, 44). Dabei scheint vom Interesse zu sein, welche Rolle Religion bei Aneignung von Wissen spielen konnte. Wenn in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft davon ausgegangen wird, dass die Menschen rational handeln, dann ergibt sich die Frage, wo die religiösen Glaubenssysteme einzuordnen sind und welche Beziehung zur Rationalität und Wissen besteht. Der Anlass für diese Klärung besteht u.a. auch darin, die von North vorgeschlagenen Lösungen zu revidieren.

Bei Diskussion des Rationalitätsbegriffs kann es nützlich sein, zwischen Rationalitätsprinzip und Rationalitätshypothese zu unterscheiden (Vanberg 2005). Das Rationalitätsprinzip bedeutet, dass Menschen zielgerichtet handeln. Es besagt, dass „menschliches Handeln in dem Sinne rational ist, dass eine gewählte Handlung für den Handelnden die vorzugswürdigste Alternative darstellt, und zwar im Lichte der Präferenzen und der Theorien, die seine Entscheidung zum Zeitpunkt der Handlung bestimmen“ (Vanberg 2005, 35). Dem Subjektivismus des individuellen Wissens wird dadurch Rechnung getragen, dass die Rationalitätsannahme durch Rationalitätshypothese erweitert wird. Die Rationalitätshypothese5 stellt die empirisch falsifizierbare Behauptung auf, dass Menschen durch realitätsadäquate Theorien geleitet werden. Die Betonung der Theoriekomponente verweist auf die Subjektivität des individuellen Wissens.

Nun ist die Frage, was sind die Quellen des menschlichen Wissens. In Anlehnung an Hayek können wir zwischen drei Ebenen des Wissens unterscheiden: genetische, kulturelle und individuelle. Die genetische Ebene bezieht sich auf die gemeinsame Evolutionsgeschichte der Menschheit. Die Evolutionsbiologie wird herangezogen, um das auf genetische Ebene angesammelte Wissen zu erklären. So hat Konrad Lorenz die a priori Kategorien Kants im Lichte der Evolutionsbiologie interpretiert und sie als Ergebnisse der biologischen Evolution erklärt.6 Diese Ebene scheint für die ganze Menschheit gleiche zu sein und daher auch ungeeignet, die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungspfade der Gesellschaften zu erklären.

Von der genetischen Wissensebene ist, nach dem hier gewählten Ansatz, die Kultur zu unterscheiden. Unter kultureller Evolution soll verstanden werden: „ein Prozess des Wachstums von Wissen, und zwar nicht so sehr im Sinne einer Zunahme des Wissens einzelner Personen, als in dem Sinne, dass das im gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhang genutzte Wissen zunimmt“ (Vanberg 1994, S. 5). Die Wissensweitergabe von einer Generation auf die andere ist vielleicht am leichtesten in der Wissenschaft zu sehen, wo es um objektives Wissen im Sinne Poppers handelt und es über die Bibliotheken für die nächsten Generationen aufbewahrt wird. Der Punkt, den Hayek immer wieder betonte, ist, dass diese Art von Wissen nur ein Teil des gesamten Wissens darstellt. „Aber wenn dies auch der augenfälligste Teil unseres ererbten Wissensbestandes ist und der Hauptteil dessen, was wir notwendigerweise wissen, so ist es im gewöhnlichen Sinn von ‚Wissen’ doch nur ein Teil; denn außerdem verfügen wir über viele Werkzeuge –im weitesten Sinne des Wortes-, die die Menschheit entwickelt hat und die es uns ermöglichen, uns in unserer Umgebung zurechtzufinden“ (Hayek 1991, 35). Hayeks Begriff der Kultur umfasst einerseits selbst die Koordinationsmechanismen des Marktes, wie Eigentum, Preismechanismus, Geld, die die Nutzung des in der Gesellschaft bestehenden Wissens ermöglichen (Horizontale Wissensnutzung) – d.h. die Institutionen selbst sind für Hayek Teil der kulturellen Evolution, also Ergebnis der evolutorischen Prozesse. Diese kulturellen Leistungen können aber die zwischen den Gesellschaften bestehenden interkulturellen Unterschiede schwer erklären. Die zweite Komponente betrifft die vertikale Wissensnutzung von Wissen, die in Form von Traditionen und Institutionen besteht, die der Mensch gebraucht, „weil sie ihm als Ergebnis einer kumulativen Wachstums zur Verfügung stehen, ohne dass sie je von einem einzelnen Verstand erdacht worden sind“ (Hayek 1991, 36). Diese Art von Wissen verkörpert die in einer Gesellschaft über Generationen gesammelte implizite Erfahrung, wiederkehrende Probleme zu lösen.

Hayeks Arbeit lässt den Eindruck entstehen, dass er mehr denjenigen Teil der kulturellen Leistungen betonte, der für die ganze Menschheit gleich ist. Wie aber Norths Ausführungen nahe legen sollten, sind die interkulturellen Unterschiede zwischen den Gesellschaften von entscheidender Bedeutung. Andererseits hat man den Eindruck, dass North selbst zwischen diesen zwei Arten von Wissen nicht klar unterscheidet. So spricht North über die Fähigkeit der Kultur das Wissen zu sammeln und er betont auch Unterschiede zwischen amerikanischer und muslimischer Welt (North 2005, 36), es wird aber auf Glaubenssysteme und nicht auf Wissen, das Problemlösungspotenzial über wiederkehrende Probleme darstellt, Bezug genommen. Die Erklärung könnte darin liegen, dass North den wirtschaftlichen Wandel explizit nicht als evolutorischen Prozess betrachtet (North 2005, 66), sondern die Zielgerichtetheit des menschlichen Handelns betont. An sich kann man an diesem Argument nichts aussetzen, die Frage ist vielmehr, wieweit dieser Ansatz selbst ausreichend ist, die Probleme zu erörtern, an denen North interessiert ist. Sicherlich ist die Betonung der Rolle der Organisationen im bestimmten Kontext berechtigt, aber es erklärt nicht, wie North das selbst betont, den kulturellen Wandel (North 2005, 58). Norths Betonung der Rolle der Organisationen, die durch bewusste Entscheidung die institutionelle Struktur bestimmen, könnte so ausgelegt werden, dass die kulturellen Unterschiede von zweitrangiger Bedeutung sind. Das würde bedeuten, dass die wirtschaftliche Stagnation auf die „falschen“ formalen Institutionen (Gesetze) zurückzuführen ist, indem festgestellt werden konnte, jeweiliges Land verfüge über ineffiziente Institutionen, die durch Organisationen verabschiedet wurden, die aufgrund „falscher“ mentalen Modelle gehandelt hatten. Dadurch wird aber das Problem umgegangen, vor dem mindestens viele Transformationsländer stehen: Das Land verfügt zwar über gute formale Institutionen, die aber unter Implementierungsdefizite leiden. Daher erscheint die Kritik an North berechtigt, seine Theorie vermöge „den kontinuierlichen institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Wandel in entwickelten Industriegesellschaften zu erklären. Sie [genüge] jedoch nicht dem eigenen Anspruch, eine allgemeine Theorie des institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Wandels offerieren zu wollen“ (Leipold 2005, 61).

Geht man aber vom Kulturverständnis aus, das vor allem die Rolle des Wissens als praktischem Problemlösungspotenzial betont, könnten selbst die von North unterstrichenen religiösen Vorstellungen in anderem Lichte erscheinen.

Der „europäische Sonderweg“ bestand darin, dass in Europa geschichtlich individuelle Freiheit ermöglicht wurde. Sei es wegen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Kirche und Staat oder wegen Systemwettbewerb zwischen unterschiedlichen Staaten. Was wichtig ist, es entstand der Rahmen, der geeignet war „die Immunisierung von Problemlösungen gegen Kritik zu erschweren, und Anreize zur Entdeckung neuer Lösungen und zu ihrer kritischen Untersuchung zu geben“ (Albert 1986, 53). Somit kann der Vorteil der „europäischen Kultur“ auch darin gesehen werden, dass es über größeres Problemlösungspotenzial verfügt als andere Kulturen. North (2005, 50) nennt dieses Wissen „artifactual structure“. Wenn aber die wirtschaftliche Leistung Europas mit Kultur in Verbindung gebracht werden kann, dann bedeutet das zuerst, dass die Menschen in anderen Kulturen, vor folgendem Problem stehen können: Es ändern sich die Präferenzen der Menschen, aber das kulturelle Erbe stellt nicht das Wissen bereit, um korrekte Theorien über die Erreichung der Ziele zu ermöglichen. Das Ergebnis dieser Art von „Wissensproblem“ könnte dann sein, dass Menschen auf „höhere“ Theorien zurückgreifen, um irgendwie die Welt weiterhin erklären zu können. Anders zu formulieren, die ausweitende Kluft zwischen Kompetenz – Schwierigkeit (Heiner, 1983) kann zur Beschränkung der Flexibilität im menschlichen Handeln führen. Diese „höheren“ Theorien können unterschiedlich aussehen, es könnte sich um Ideologie handeln (Kommunismus) oder auch um Religion.

Der einzige Unterschied des hier verfolgten Ansatzes im Vergleich zu Norths Ansatz kann nur darin liegen, dass diese Perspektive, wenn es stimmt, den Akzent auf das Wissensproblem setzt und nicht auf Glaubenssystem. North scheint das Hauptproblem in den falschen (religiösen) Glaubenssystemen zu sehen und seine Vorschläge zur Herstellung der Ordnung sind nicht gerade ermunternd. Während aus dem hier vorgeschlagenen Ansatz folgen würde, dass: 1. praktische Wirkung der Religion mit dem in der Gesellschaft akkumulierten Wissen in Verbindung gebracht wird; und 2. wenn man zeigen kann, wie dieses Wissen sich ändern kann, dann könnte auch das Problem der Glaubenssysteme überwunden werden, die nach North entscheidende Rolle im wirtschaftlichen Wandel zu spielen scheinen.

4. Ausblick

Ordnungsökonomische Rezeptur für eine gute Wettbewerbsordnung des Marktes ist bekannt: Stärkung des Leistungswettbewerbs. Dafür ist der starke Staat im Sinne von Walter Eucken erforderlich, was für Hayek materiellen Rechtsstaat bedeutete. Materieller Rechtsstaat ist aber das, was Vanberg Herrschaft der aufgeklärten, konsensfähigen konstitutionellen Interessen nennt. Wie diese Interessen unter oben geschilderten Bedingungen zur Verwirklichung kommen könnten, soll untersucht werden. Dabei soll außer der Problematik der „falschen Mentalen Modelle“ im Sinne North auch der Tatsache Rechnung getragen werden, dass in jeder Gesellschaft jederzeit „Handelnsordnung“ im Sinne Hayek (1969) vorhanden ist, deren Änderung eigentliches Ziel der Reformen sein soll (Vanberg 1997). Wie die Handelnsordnung ihrerseits die Durchsetzungsprobleme des Rechts beeinflussen kann, soll auch geklärt werden.


Literaturverzeichnis

Abraham, A. and J.-P.Platteau.2002: “Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous Community Imperfections. Working Paper, University of Namur, Department of Economics. Zitiert nach North (2005).

Albert, H (1986): “Freiheit und Ordnung – Zwei Abhandlungen zum Problem einer offenen Gesellschaft”.

Hayek, F. A. (1969): “Freiburger Studien”.

Hayek, F.A. (1991): „Die Verfassung der Freiheit“.

Heiner, R. (1983): „The origin of predictable behavior”, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, Nr. 4 (Sept., 1983), 560-595.

Leipold, H. (2005): “Kulturvergleichende Institutionenökonomik”.

Mantzavinos, C (2001): “Individuals, Institutions, and Markets”.

North, D.C. (2005): „Understanding the Process of Economic Change“.

Vanberg, V. (1997): “Systemtransformation, Ordnungsevolution und Protektion: Zum Problem der Anpassung von Wirtschaftssystemen an ihre Umwelt”, in: Cassel, D. (Hrsg.): „Institutionelle Probleme der Systemtransformation“

Vanberg, V. (2001): “The Constitution of Markets – Essays in Political Economy”.

Vanberg, V. (2005): “Rationalitätsprinzip und Rationalitätshypothese: Zum methodologischen Status der Theorie rationalen Handelns”, in: Siegenthaler, H. (Hrsg.): „Rationalität im Prozess kultureller Evolution“.




Wednesday, August 23, 2006

First Georgian Magazine - "Me" Covering the Issues Concerning Sexual Minorities

Media.ge reports that the first georgian Magazine Covering the Issues Concerning Sexual Minorities is Published in Georgia. It's published by Inclusive Foundation. Inclusive Foundation (IF) is non-governmental organization that aims to promote equality for and protect rights of LGBT community in Georgia. The IF was founded in 2006 and started implementation of the five years project that will provide several services to LGBT community and general public. Foundation offers psychological, legal and health counseling; they organize weekly empowerment meetings and discussions for the community; dissemination of information regarding LGBT issues through this magazine and the website that will be operational from September 2006 (www.inclusive-foundation.org); documentation and response to cases of LGBT rights violation; advocacy; lobbyng; training; resource centre facility for researchers; support to LGBT art initiatives; sexual health research, education and supplying community with sexual health protection means.

Let's wait and see how georgian society will react on that...

Tuesday, August 22, 2006

Viktor Pelevin :The Sacred Book of a Werewolf

Victor Pelevin, very interesting contemporary Russian novelist who The New Yorker named one of the Best European Writers Under 35.

Born in Moscow in 1962, Pelevin is best known in the West for his short satirical novel, ''Omon Ra,'' which is based on the conceit that the Soviet Union's spectacular success in using robotic spacecraft early in the space age was a fraud.

“The Sacred Book of a Werewolf” provides a satirical account of Russian life as seen through the eyes of a 3,000-year-old Chinese werewolf – but with a catch. “Werefox” would actually be a more appropriate term, as the character, A Khuli, usually exists in the form of a fox. The fact that she is manifested in the novel as a pretty teenaged girl working as a prostitute in Moscow not only adds to the confusion, but also allows Pelevin to introduce a wide range of typical Russian male characters, from the repentant masochist liberal intellectual to a brutal drug addict Federal Security Service (FSB) operative.

I recommend this book to all !!!

You can download this book in russian from here (do it in IE) or buy at Amazon.com. You can find some reviews in english on his books here.
In Russian language you can find almost everything from this author at Lib.ru.
You can find also two short essays translated in english here.


update!!!

Pelevin's Hompage where you can download his books (also audiobooks).

Monday, August 21, 2006

The New York Times about Abkhazia

Very interesting Article by C. J. CHIVERS is published in the New York Times on 20th of August, about russian tourists and political situation in this region of Georgia.

Here you can find also pictures from Abkhazia with commentaries of young georgian photojournalist who took them.

Friday, August 11, 2006

‘Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood

Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova.


Author: Nicu Popescu

(Nicu Popescu is OSI Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies and is also a PhD candidate at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.)


you can download pdf version from here



Introduction

The international community has been increasingly concerned with the secessionist conflicts that have marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conflicts in the Transnistrian region of Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan are no longer ‘internal affairs’ of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The EU and NATO enlargements have brought these organisations closer to the conflict areas and have increased their interest in promoting solutions to these conflicts. In the context of the international fight against terrorism, there are fears that the existence of failed states or uncontrolled areas can have repercussions far beyond their respective regions. The relative stabilisation of the Balkans will allow the EU and NATO to pay more attention to conflicts that are further away from their neighbourhood. In conjunction with these new international trends, Moldova and Georgia – two of the countries affected by conflict – have become active advocates of a greater international role in their conflict resolution processes. At the same time, the lack of progress on conflict settlement for more than a decade raises uncomfortable, albeit legitimate, questions about the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution frameworks. In other words, the international community is entering a phase in which it is reassessing its policies towards the secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union. But the challenge is not only to help solve these conflicts but also how to deal with Russia in the conflict resolution process.
Russia has been heavily involved in the conflicts. Assessments of its role in the conflicts vary, but none disputes the fact that Russia plays an important role in the conflict regions. Its policies have been multifaceted. They include political, economic, security and humanitarian dimensions. This paper therefore attempts to map Russia’s policies towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.1 The first part discusses Russia’s role in the conflicts during the nineties and gives some background information on the secessionist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. The second part discusses policy trends in the Russian Federation that have inspired a new feeling of self-confidence. The third part analyses how this Russian self-confidence is resulting in new pro-active policies towards the secessionist entities. These policies include political, economic and diplomatic support, state-building assistance, maintaining the status quo, making use of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ and taking over some of the institutions of the secessionist entities.


Russia and the conflicts

Russia has been a player during and after the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria (see Box 1). During the 1990s, Russia’s policies towards the conflicts were largely supportive of the secessionist forces, even if not always unambiguously so. The main type of Russian support was directed through conflict settlement mechanisms. Russian-led peacekeeping operations have de facto guarded the borders of the secessionist entities, helping to maintain a status quo that was favourable to the secessionist sides. Peacekeepers2 allowed the secessionist elites to pursue state-building projects while deterring the metropolitan states from attempting to regain control of the regions.3
Russia’s role in the conflict settlement negotiations has also been questioned. Moldova’s assessment of the format of negotiations in which Russia played a key role was straightforward. Moldova’s President Voronin argued that: “The five-party negotiations and the existing peacekeeping mechanism proved their ineffectiveness, and are not able to lead to a long-lasting solution. The dragging of the settlement process contributes to the consolidation of the separatist regime and the promotion of certain mafia-type geopolitical interests, which are foreign to the interests of the population on the two banks of the Dnestr River”.5 Moreover, a resolution of the Georgian Parliament claims that “the Russian Federation does nothing to promote the process of conflict settlement on the territory of Georgia, whereas in fact, the current situation is quite the contrary. A wide range of steps made by Russia currently strengthens the separatist regimes…”6

However, Russia’s role has not always been as unambiguously supportive of the secessionist entities as it is often assumed. Until just a few years ago, Russian policies towards the conflicts have sometimes veered between open support for the secessionists and periods of rapprochement with Georgia and Moldova. In the mid-1990s, there were moments when Russia has reduced the level of its support for Abkhazia and to a lesser extent for South Ossetia. This can be partly explained by the secessionist challenge posed by Chechnya for Russia’s own territorial integrity. Under such conditions, Russia was rather constrained in its potential support for other secessionist movements in the former Soviet Union, as it was seen as a dangerous precedent for Russia itself. Secondly, in 1994, Georgia joined the CIS and its Collective Security Treaty, and accepted Russian military bases on its territory. Georgia’s implicit expectations were that in exchange Russia would support its efforts to reassert control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s understanding of the deal differed. Russia supported Eduard Shevardnadze to assert himself as the leader of the country in the context of the civil war with the supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, but did not take a pro-active stance on the issue of Georgia’s reunification. Even so, it did take part in a CIS blockade against Abkhazia (which is formally still in force but is not being enforced). In Moldova, the rapprochement with Russia followed the arrival in power of the then pro-Russian Communist party in 2001 and lasted until 2003. Moldova’s implicit expectation was that a rapprochement with Russia would give it the all important support that it needed in its efforts to resolve the conflict in Transnistria. Thus, Moldova implicitly agreed to follow Moscow’s political line in international relations, create favourable, even preferential treatment for Russian businesses, promote the Russian language in Moldova and generally move closer to the Russian Federation in political, social and economic terms. The main thing that Moldova wanted in exchange was the withdrawal of Russian support for the Transnistrian authorities and the ousting of Igor Smirnov, Transnistria’s self-proclaimed president and a Russian citizen. Between 2001 and 2003, it seemed that the policy line in Moscow was that a reunited and friendly Moldova was more important to Russian interests than a pro-Russian Transnistria and an unfriendly Republic of Moldova. Thus Russia moved to limit its support for Transnistria in order to promote a settlement of the conflict. According to an official, discussions on withdrawing Russian support for the Smirnov led authorities culminated in talks between Moldova and Russia about which region to appoint Smirnov as governor in order to clear him out of the way and move towards a settlement of the conflict.7 However, it seems that this withdrawal of support was only ever half-hearted and in the end everything went back to square one – strong Russian support for Transnistria and tense relations with Moldova. The turning point was the failure of the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’, a unilateral Russian plan to settle the conflict on largely Russian terms, which was rejected by Moldova in November 2003. After this, Moldovan-Russian relations have gone from bad to worse. The chopping and changing Russian policies towards the secessionist entities in the 1990s were never on a large enough scale to truly shake the status quo that allowed the de facto states to carry on their existence. Periodic rapprochements between Russia and Moldova or Georgia did not lead to the settlement of the conflicts, as both sides of the deal had erroneous expectations of each other’s intensions. This made the deals fail, and made relations between Russia on the one hand and Moldova and Georgia on the other considerably more complicated. Weighed down with such a heavy baggage of mutual frustrations, Russia has started to change its approach to the conflicts, largely due to internal developments in Russia.


Russia’s new self-confidence


The Russia of 2006 has obtained a newly felt sense of its own power. This explains a number of Russian policies in the CIS. Contrary to the situation just a few years ago, Russia’s agenda is not inward-looking for the first time in almost two decades. Russia wants and thinks it is ready to act assertively around all of its own borders and beyond. This new assertiveness was certainly reflected in Russian policy towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, but these were only examples of a broader change in the thinking of Russian decision-makers. A simple comparison suffices. In 2000, the Russian Federation stated that the top priority of its foreign policy was to “create favourable external conditions for steady development of Russia, for improving its economy”.8
Accordingly, Russia's foreign policy was subordinated to domestic imperatives. In 2005, the mood changed. In his 2005 annual address, President Vladimir Putin claimed that it was “certain that Russia should continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent”.9

Why does Russia feel so strong?

One factor is the state of its economy. Russia has experienced steady growth since 1999 plus a significant inflow of cash due to high oil and gas prices. Unlike in the 1990s, Russia is not concerned with a lack of resources to pursue its foreign policy. The 2000 ‘foreign policy concept’ bluntly stated that Russia's capacity to address the challenges it faced was “aggravated by the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad”.10 A few years later, Putin claimed that “the growth of the economy, political stability and the strengthening of the state have had a beneficial effect on Russia’s international position”.11 A second factor is domestic politics. An authoritarian government that does not feel challenged in domestic politics is less compromising in its foreign policy.12 The current elites in Russia have ensured a nearly unchallengeable dominance at the expense of democratic pluralism. There is a certain paradox in that internationally the Russian elite project their state as strong, dynamic and pragmatic, whereas internally they often depict the state as weak, vulnerable and alarmist. The then head of the presidential administration Dmitry Medvedev13 stated in April 2005 that “if we cannot consolidate the elites, Russia will disappear as a state”.14 It is claimed that Russia is facing a moment of existential danger. By building the image of a Russia under siege from Islamic terrorists and Western-inspired ‘orange’ revolutionaries, the domestic agenda is to rally everybody around the existing authorities. Thus, the centralisation of power and open authoritarianism are not only excused and explained but deemed necessary and legitimised. It is the only way to preserve the state and the nation. As a result of such a discourse, there remains no mainstream political force in Russia that would or could challenge the dominance of the Putin administration. The political space in Russia has been shaped in a way that only radicals – extremist nationalists and Islamic terrorists – are the challengers. In this context Putin is seen as the lesser of evils. Even Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly Russia’s richest oligarch, claims from jail that Putin is “more liberal and more democratic than 70% of the population”.15 Thus, as a resultnof such a discourse of weakness, the government has the excuses to centralise power in order to become strong – domestically and internationally.
A third factor is international politics. International events also seem to play into the hands of a new-found feeling of strength in Russia. Iraq has become a quagmire. The US is too busy running around in the Afghanistan-Iraq-Iran triangle. The EU is seen as being in the midst of a profound and paralysing crisis. In fact, many Russians consider the EU crisis to be profound but certainly not paralysing. Both the US and EU need Russia in their attempts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability for non-peaceful use. In the CIS, the democratic governments that emerged after the 'rose and orange revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine respectively are struggling along in the face of major difficulties. Thepopularity of Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili seems to be on the wane, the country is only making slow economic progress and political centralisation seems to be on the rise. In Ukraine, President Viktor Yushchenko is politically weak, the economy is performing poorly and political stability cannot yet be seen at the end of the tunnel. In contrast to these post-revolutionary states, the regimes in Belarus and Uzbekistan seem as strong as ever. A fourth factor is Chechnya. The defeat of the nationalist secessionist movement in Chechnya meant that Russia is no longer fearful of supporting secessionism in other states. In the 1990s, having a strong secessionist movement on its own territory, Russia was at least outwardly supportive of the territorial integrity of other states such as Georgia and Moldova, and not only them. Any precedent for successful secession resulting from violent conflict was seen as questioning the future of Chechnya in Russia. Thus, for most of the 1990s Russia has been hesitating between the tendency to support the secessionist entities in Moldova and Georgia and the fears of spillover effects for Russia itself. All this has changed. The second Chechen war that started in 1999 led to the defeat of the secessionist movement in Chechnya. Certainly, the Chechen guerrillas still pose a serious security challenge to the internal stability of the Russian Federation but they are not a credible secessionist force. President Putin is right in saying that “there are other regions in the northern Caucasus where the situation is even more worrying than it is in Chechnya”.16 The war in Chechnya is not a war for or against the independence of Chechnya. In fact it is not a Chechen conflict anymore, but a north Caucasus conflict with large religious, social and security implications. Russia defeated the nationalist secessionist movement in Chechnya, but ended up with a geographically larger and potentially more destructive security challenge. Whatever the instability in the north Caucasus, Russia feels that the Chechen factor is no longer a constraint on its policies towards the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova.17 Thus, in Russia’s assessment it is the right international and domestic context to start acting. If before 2004 Russia was defensive, by 2006 it had started to be on the offensive. A 2000 assessment of the situation argued that, in the CIS, Russia’s objective is “to maintain, rather than enlarge the Russian presence in the region. Moscow tries to save what it still has, rather than extend its political and military forward bases in its southern neighbourhood”.18 This is not the case anymore. In 2006, Dmitry Trenin from the Carnegie Moscow Centre think tank argues that Russian leadership “came to the conclusion that the withdrawal has ended, and it is time to counter-attack… it is time to re-establish a great power and that the CIS is the space where Russian economic, political, and informational dominance should be established”.19 The 'new thinking' of the Russian Federation, was put forward as an article for the Wall Street Journal by Sergei Ivanov, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. He claimed that Russia's two main challenges are “interference in Russia's internal affairs by foreign states, either directly or through structures that they support... [and] violent assault on the constitutional order of some post- Soviet states”.20 No distinction is made between nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and networks used to finance terrorist activities in Russia and the Western-funded democracy-promoting NGOs. Both are seen as foreign organisations seeking to destabilise the internal situation in Russia and its allies. Putin said in the aftermath of the Beslan siege that “the weak get beaten up”.21 International affairs are a fight, and in this fight Russia has to re-establish its regional dominance. This is the new prism through which Russia sees its international relations. Thus, the new Russian agenda is not to maintain current levels of influence in the CIS but to re-establish Russian dominance in most of the CIS. Russia’s foreign policy objectives are not defensive for the first time in more than two decades. Russian policies on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are both indicators of a new trend and a means to put into practice a new foreign policy agenda. Quite logically, Russia’s new self-confidence has developed into a new set of pro-active policies, which was clearly demonstrated by its policies towards the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova.

Russia’s pro-active policies towards the
secessionist entities

Russia’s policies towards secessionist entities are marked by an official recognition of the territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia but in practical terms by open support for many of the demands of the secessionist entities. The ambiguity of Russian policies creates important incentives for entities to persist in their quest to secede. This quest is supported through a number of policies.


Political support

Russia gives high level political attention to the secessionist authorities and has often acted as a bridge between the three self-proclaimed republics, which created a community of their own, informally called ‘SNG-2’, or even ‘NATO-2’.22
While the level of institutionalisation of SNG-2 should not be overestimated, it has summits, ministerial meetings and cooperation networks. In fact most of these summits take place in Moscow and the leaders of the secessionist entities are received by high-level Russian officials.23 The Russian Foreign Ministry also typically refers to the leaders of the unrecognised secessionist entities as “presidents”, implying a degree of recognition of the secessionist entities. Other examples of high-level political support include President Putin meeting the leader of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh and South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity and even apparently trying to set up a meeting for them with EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana24 in Sochi in April 2005. Similarly, high-level support was offered to a presidential candidate in Abkhazia’s 2004 elections when the (defeated) candidate Raul Khajimba was campaigning with posters depicting him and President Putin shaking hands.25

‘Passportisation’

A visible example of Russian support is where Russia has granted citizenship to the residents of the unrecognized entities. Some 90% of the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are said to have Russian passports.26 The number is considerably smaller in Transnistria, where some 15% of the population hold Russian passports. The policy of ‘passportisation’ is a state policy. In the passports themselves it is clearly stated that they are issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry.27 Its main objective is to secure a legitimate right for Russia to claim to represent the interests of the secessionist entities because they consist of Russian citizens. Thus Russia is creating a political and even legal basis for intervention for the sake of protecting its own ‘citizens’ in the secessionist entities. Russia’s introduction of visa regimes for Georgia in 2001 is also designed, inter alia, to strengthen the separatist entities and weaken the legitimacy of the states. The residents of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were exempted from the visa regime.


Conflict settlement mechanisms

Russia plays a key role in the conflict resolution negotiation process. Russia often acts not so much as a mediator equally distant from the positions of both sides, but as an actor in negotiations with its own interests. Russia is not opposed to conflict resolution. It is rather interested in a settlement that first and foremost serves Russian interests by respecting a number of conditions. A first condition is that the secessionist entities need to have decisive influence over the affairs of the reunified states, even if it means a possible future power-sharing arrangement may not work in practice. Second, Russia has to act as the main power-broker in any possible power-sharing arrangement. This would be possible because Russia would remain the main external ‘guarantor’ of the settlement, but also because of the potentially low viability of the reunified states, which will have to rely on external power brokers.
The Russian guarantees also include a military presence. Interestingly enough, the main Russian-brokered agreement that came closest to solving a conflict – the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ for Transnistria28 met these three conditions: 1) high level of influence for the secessionist entity to the point of creating a dysfunctional state, 2) Russia as the main power broker and 3) Russian military presence. When Moldova implicitly accepted these three conditions, progress towards a new agreement to settle the conflict accelerated. However, in the end Moldova backed down because of doubts about the viability of the arrangement, which was clearly highlighted by the negative international reactions to the memorandum, including from the US, the EU and the OSCE. Similarly, Russian proposals to Georgia and Moldova to create ‘common states’ in the late 1990s also reflected a level of decentralisation that was not very likely to work in practice.29


Diplomatic support

Russia often supports the secessionist entities on the international arena. One example is that three annual OSCE Ministerial Councils in 2003, 2004 and 2005 failed to adopt
common statements because of disagreements between an overwhelming number of OSCE member states on the one hand and Russia on the other. These disagreements were precisely related to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and the withdrawal of Russian troops from these countries. The issue of unresolved conflicts is more and more prominent on the EU-Russia agenda, including in the road map for the ‘common space of cooperation in the field of external security’ where conflicts in the ‘adjacent’ regions are considered one of the priority areas.


‘Outsourcing’ of institutions

Russia has also been crucial in providing support for state and institution building in the secessionist regions. In fact, some of the security institutions of the de facto states are ‘outsourced’ to the Russian Federation. ‘Outsourcing’ is used in business jargon to describe a situation in which the organisational functions of an enterprise are transferred to a third party or country.30 A somehow similar phenomenon is occurring with the ‘state’ institutions of the secessionist entities. They are ‘outsourced’ to Russian state institutions. However, if ‘outsourcing’ in businesses presupposes that the ‘outsourcer’ keeps overall control of the organisational and production functions of the enterprise, this is not always the case in the secessionist entities. While they initially ‘outsourced’ such functions as defence and intelligence institutions to the Russian Federation, they have to a large extent ceased to control them. The local ‘security’ institutions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are often headed by Russians or officials who are de facto delegated by state institutions of the Russian Federation. This most often includes staff in the local intelligence services and the defence ministries. Examples of Russians de facto delegated to the secessionist entities include defence ministers Anatoli Barankevich (South Ossetia) and Sultan Sosnaliev (Abkhazia), local intelligence chief Iarovoi (South Ossetia) and Interior Minister Mindzaev (South Ossetia).31 But Russian presence is also visible beyond the security services. An Abkhazia Prime Minister in 2004/2005 Nodar Khashba came from the Russian ministry of emergency situations. The incumbent Prime Minister Morozov in South Ossetia is also from Russia. The ‘outsourcing’ of the institutions of the secessionist entities to Russia is at its most prevalent in South Ossetia, somehow less so in Abkhazia, and relatively little (beyond the security services) in Transnistria. Such arrangements are not necessarily welcome in the secessionist entities themselves, especially in Abkhazia and Transnistria, but are, according to officials, desired mainly by Russia.32


Economic support

Russia plays a key role in the economic sustainability of the secessionist entities. In fact one can credibly make the argument that the ‘independence’ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia depends heavily on Russia.33 Russia is certainly the most important trading partner of the secessionist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian officials claimed that while some of the Georgian exports were banned from entering Russia on phytosanitary grounds, similar goods from Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to be accepted, which indicated the political nature of manipulation of trade issues in the region.34 For years, Transnistrian industry has been benefiting from Russian subsidies. Transnistria’s debt to Gazprom amounts to one billion euro, which means that for years Transnistria has not paid for its gas consumption.35 In fact the competitive advantage of Transnistrian industry is very much based on these kinds of subsidies. The social dimension of Russian support is also considerable in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian government not only granted citizenships to an overwhelming majority of residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also pays pensions there.36 These pensions are higher than Georgia’s, which creates additional incentives for these regions to join the Russian Federation rather than seek a settlement of the conflict. The paying of pensions and granting of citizenship is explained by humanitarian concerns that the Russian Federation has about the residents of these regions.37 Russia is also the main investor in the secessionist regions. Some investments in Transnistrian industry and the Abkhaz tourist infrastructure are justified on economic grounds. However, it is clear that the conflict regions are far from being attractive for investments and many such investments are driven by political imperatives and not economic logic. At least some, if not most, of Russian investments take place not because they make sense economically but because Russian authorities put forward Russian businessmen to take part in such investments as a sign of support for the secessionist entities.38 In a state where businesses are closely intertwined with the state, as is the case in Russia, such practices are not difficult to implement. Economic support for the secessionist entities is coupled with economic pressure on Moldova and Georgia. In 2005, Russia introduced restrictions on meat and vegetable exports from Moldova and Georgia to Russia. In March 2006 Russia banned all Moldovan and Georgian wine and brandy exports to Russia, as well as Georgian mineral water. At the same time Russia increased gas prices for Moldova and Georgia. Such restrictions did not affect the secessionist entities. The explanation was simple. In the words of the Russian ambassador to Moldova, “one thing is a Russian compatriot in Moldova or Kirghizia, and another thing is a compatriot in Transnistria or Abkhazia”.39 The latter are certainly closer than the former.


The ‘status quo game’

Russia’s preferred policy is to preserve the status quo. The status quo gives Russia enough room for manoeuvre to safeguard its interests in the conflict areas. Thus Russia is set to prevent the modification of the conflict resolution mechanisms and Western involvement in conflict resolution. Its main argument is that the conflicts should stay “frozen” and that any attempt to “thaw” them is dangerous and counterproductive. However the conflicts are not frozen at all.40 It is their settlement that is frozen. The preservation of the status quo means the entrenchment and deepening of the conflicts. Thus the ‘status quo game’ means moving away from a solution while fuelling tensions, which could escalate at any moment.


The ‘Kosovo precedent’

In the context of discussing the Kosovo issue, Russia came closest [and at the highest level] in accepting that Kosovo does constitute a precedent worth considering in Georgia. President Putin stated in 2006 that “if someone thinks that Kosovo can be granted full independence as a state, then why should the Abkhaz or the South-Ossetian peoples not also have the right to statehood? I am not talking here about how Russia would act. But we know, for example, that Turkey recognised the Republic of Northern Cyprus. I am not saying that Russia would immediately recognise Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent states, but international life knows such precedents … we need generally accepted, universal principles for resolving these problems”.41 Russia has been moving towards acceptance of Kosovo’s independence while trying to extract the maximum from the Kosovo precedent in the post-Soviet space. The Kosovo precedent has certainly infused new trends into the politics of the de facto states. Kosovo’s possible move towards independence, albeit “conditional”, creates a new raison d’être for the secessionist entities to resist any conflict settlement in the hope that sooner or later they will follow Kosovo.42 For example, the Abkhaz de facto president openly states that “if Kosovo is recognised, Abkhazia will be recognised in the course of three days. I am absolutely sure of that”.43



De facto annexation

The overall result of the above-mentioned policies is that the secessionist entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are moving towards being incorporated into the Russian Federation de facto. In fact the secessionist entities ‘outsource’ not only some of their institutions but the control of their entities to the Russian Federation. Most of the population in these regions have Russian passports, pensioners receive pensions from the Russian state, the Russian rouble is the local currency, many of the de facto officials of the secessionist entities are sent ‘on missions’ by the Russian Federation. In addition, there is a process of legislative harmonisation between the legal systems of the Russian Federation and those of the secessionist entities. And even in Transnistria, which currently has its own currency, Russia has raised the issue of Transnistria eventually adopting the Russian rouble as the local currency.44 Reflecting these developments, Moscow’s policies towards these secessionist regions look very much like Moscow’s policy towards other Russian regions. This was very visible during the heavy and high-level intervention of Russia in the Abkhaz presidential elections in 2004. In an interview, an expert in Moscow said that “Abkhazia is a de facto continuation of the Krasnodar region” of Russia.45 The fact that Russia takes over the ‘power’ structures in the secessionist entities also looks very much like Russian regional politics. In the Russian Federation, the control of the ‘power structures’ – Ministry of Defence, intelligence, prosecutor’s office and police – are a competence of the federal centre, i.e. Moscow. Russian regions do not control the security institutions at regional level, even if they have some degree of self-governance in political and economic matters. The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not far from that. The secessionist entities are not simply a continuation of Russia. Abkhazia stresses that it wants to be an independent state,46 not a Russian region. They also stress that in the 2004 Abkhaz presidential elections the Moscow-backed candidate lost the elections. Transnistria does not have a border with Russia and it would be difficult to see how a second ‘Kaliningrad’ in Transnistria would work in practice. Moreover, the interests of the secessionist entities, their domestic policy patterns and strategic goals might differ from Russia’s preferences. However, their rapprochement with Russia is not far from a point of no return, mainly so in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


Conclusions

Russia plays a dominant role in the survival and evolution of the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova. There have been periods when Russia was rather supportive of the governments of Moldova and Georgia. However, for the last few years Russian policies towards the secessionist entities have become more assertive. This was due to a new feeling of self-confidence among Russian elites.
This new self-confidence has been inspired by a number of factors, such as economic growth in Russia, consolidation of Putin’s ‘power vertical’, the defeat of the Chechen secessionist movement and the West’s problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. These have all led to a feeling in Moscow that Russia has the resources and the proper international conditions to reassert its dominance in the former Soviet Union. Stepping up support for the secessionist entities is seen as a way to achieve that. The policies of Russian support for the secessionist entities of the former Soviet Union are a complex web of political, economic, social, humanitarian, security and military actions.
These policies include keeping military forces on the ground – not only peacekeepers but also military bases, training of military forces, providing economic subsidies, granting Russian citizenship and passports (the policy of so-called ‘passportisation’), paying pensions, granting preferential trade regimes, ensuring diplomatic and political support on the international stage, interfering in the domestic politics of the unrecognised entities, using conflict settlement mechanisms to freeze the conflict resolution processes, delegating Russian state employees to serve in key posts in the unrecognised governments of the secessionist entities etc. These policies of support are combined with economic and political pressure on the governments of Moldova and Georgia. An overall assessment of Russia’s policies towards the secessionist entities is that in many instances they create serious disincentives for any conflict settlement. The policy of strengthening the secessionist regimes and weakening legitimate states creates serious obstacles to conflict resolution. Under such conditions it is not only possible but is even attractive for the secessionist entities to keep the conflicts unresolved. However, with the conflicts kept unresolved and an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, the secessionist entities are becoming more and more de facto parts of the Russian Federation. Moscow’s policy towards these regions in many instances resembles policies towards subjects of the Russian Federation. Thus the paradox is that, in their fight for independence, the secessionist entities are quickly ‘outsourcing’ this independence to another state.

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Georgia’s first open championship in ballooning

will be held in the Kartli Valley on October 4-8 2006


Organizing the event are:

National Aeronautics Federation
The Kakheti region Governor Administration
Georgian Civil Aviation Authority
Georgian Tourism Department
Georgian Sports Department


The newspaper "Iveria" 1891

Tbilisi, 1910

We invite pilots from all over the world to take part in the competition; we commit ourselves to cover the following expenses:
Accommodation in a sports Camping, Half Board;
Convoying vehicles matching the number of balloons + fuel (gasoline) in quantities necessary for the securing of the flights;
Ground support service (two persons per team)
Gas fuel in quantities, necessary for the securing of the flights;
Topographic maps – two copies per team;
Insurance fee.

The participants will compete for the following trophies:
Pos 1-3
The Mcxeta-Mtianeti region Governor’s Cup
The National Stage of the Black Sea Cup

The Competitions Program will include:
The overall number of flights – 5
The number of sports flights - 4


Day 1 (Oct 4)
Arrival, accommodation, registration of the pilots and balloons, distribution of vehicles and ground support teams, comradely dinner


Day 2 (Oct 5)
Morning - trial flight
Evening – general briefing, the Opening ceremony, competition flight - the Black Sea Cup Georgian stage (“Golden Fleece”)


Day 3 (Oct 6)
Morning – competition flight
Evening – competition flight - The Mcxeta-Mtianeti region Governor’s Cup ( “The Wine Barrel”)


Day 4 ( Oct 7)
Morning – competition flight
Evening – the closing ceremony, presentation with awards
The gala banquet

Day 5 (Oct 8)
Departure of pilots

Awards and prizes:

Pos 1-3 awards shall be distributed according to the overall results in all the events. The exact form of the awards is being specified with the sponsors – Georgia’s leading wine manufacturers.



The Mcxeta-Mtianeti region Governor’s Cup

Objective:

10 empty wine barrels positioned in the form of a 4-row triangle; row 1 – one barrel, row 2 – two barrels, row 3 – three barrels, row 4 – four barrels.
The diameter of the barrel’s neck – 1m
The distance between barrels in a row -50m
The distance between rows – 50m
The number of points awarded for the barrel in the first row – 1000
Second -500 pts
Third -333 pts
Fourth – 250 pts

Task: starting from the distance of no less than 1 km to hit the inside of the barrel with a marker. Each pilot has 10 markers. The pilot has the right to drop all his markers into one target. In this case the points he/she gains equal the value of the barrel multiplied by the number of the markers that hit its inside. However, if a pilot hits two or more targets, on top of the points gained from the markers that hit the barrel, he/she gains bonus points. Each pilot has the right to two starts. The pilot that gains the most points shall be the winner and he shall be presented with the The Mcxeta-Mtianeti region Governor’s Cup a 100 –liter oak barrel of Kakhetian red wine “Saperavi”.


The Georgian National Stage of “The Black Sea Trophy”.

Objective: A five-meter pole is mounted with a hoop with lamb skin stretched inside it – “The Golden Fleece”

Task: Starting from a distance of no less than one km to pick the hoop off the pole. Each pilot is entitled to two start attempts.
The pilot that manages to be the first to pick off the “Golden Fleece” shall be the winner and he/she shall be presented with “The Golden Fleece”. However, to keep the national heritage in Georgia, “The Golden Fleece” has been insured to the amount of $ 1000.00 and the winner has a choice – ether to receive the lamb skin or its money equivalent.


AX-8 ‘St. George', the first hot air balloon, officially registrated in Georgia



Pilots that have submitted their participation applications:

Georgia

1. Revaz Uturgauri АХ-8 "St. George"
2.Vatslav Shaginian AХ-8 "Lion"

Russia

3. Yuri Taran АХ-7 "Moscow"
4. Stanislav Feodorov АХ-7 "Augur"
5. Sergei Grishin АХ-8 "Allied Nippon"
6. Alexei Koniaev AX-8 ''Allied Nippon''
7. Anton Morev АХ-7 "Citroen"
8. Cergei Bazhenov AX-8 "Yuri Rost"
9. Michael Bakanov АХ-8 "Grand Park"
10. Sergei Vinogradov AX-7 "ELVA-ZETO"
11. Dimitri Gorbachov АХ-8 "Smolensk-Atoll"
12. Andrei Kulkov AX-7 "Kedr'

United Аrab Emirats

13. Abdul Aziz Nasser AX-8 "Zayed"

Czech Republic

14. Michael Suchi GP "Kubicek"
15. Pavel Kostrhun АХ-7 "E. on"

Japan

16. Tetsuhiro Su AX-8 "Cosmos"

Wednesday, August 09, 2006

Drugs in Georgia (subotex)


Tom Parfitt from Guardian writes interesting article, about illegal imports of a UK-made drug - Subotex, which have been credited, with a steep rise in the number of drug abusers in Georgia.

Manufactured in the UK, Subutex pills are available on doctor's prescription in more than 30 countries worldwide - including most of western Europe - as a supervised treatment for heroin withdrawal.

But instead of being used to curb withdrawal, thousands of pills are being snapped up by "doctor shoppers" in countries where it is legal who then sell them on to the black market.

The International Narcotics Control Board estimates there has been an 80% increase in the number of drug abusers in Georgia since 2003, a spurt it attributes to the growing availability of illegally imported Subutex.

Subutex is the most profitable drug in Georgia. You can buy seven tablets for $20 in France and then sell each one in Georgia for $120. For addicts, the drug is cheaper and more accessible than heroin. Dealers are numerous and each tablet can be shared into five or six doses......

Read the full version of an article here



Monday, August 07, 2006

Статья про Тбилиси

Автор: Вишневецкая Юлия


Тбилисский «Макдональдс» около метро Руставели. Уютная виртуальная страна чизбургеров и бумажных упаковок, населенная загадочными кавказскими пришельцами. Гордые черноглазые красавицы из поэм Лермонтова изображают американское дружелюбие, снисходительно пробивая чеки и благодаря за покупку. Седовласый долгожитель с важным видом кормит свою внучку карамельным мороженым. Семья из десяти человек пытается поместиться вокруг маленького железного столика на улице и, похоже, сейчас закатит большое воскресное застолье. Для меня это все полная загадка – как будто здесь в эти коробочки и стаканчики упаковано какое-то совсем другое, незнакомое мне содержимое и содержание...........

Впервые приезжая в Тбилиси, поражаешься тому, как жизнь в этом городе напоминает сцены из грузинского кино. Все наши мифы и стереотипы о грузинах здесь собраны в какой-то повышенной концентрации: таксисты действительно ездят как сумасшедшие – врубают на полную громкость какие-нибудь деревенские хоровые песнопения и, перекрикивая их, рассказывают тебе какой-нибудь давно известный анекдот.....

........Служба закончилась, из церкви выходит толпа, а вслед за ней – два священника, один совсем седой, другой, наоборот, черный как смоль. В надетых поверх ряс кожаных куртках, с массивными серебряными цепями, они слегка напоминают московских металлистов. Священнослужители садятся на какую-то скамеечку, достают шахматную доску, расставляют фигуры. Я хожу вокруг с фотоаппаратом – они полностью погружены в игру, не обращают на меня ни малейшего внимания. Один из них достает из складок одеяния сотовый телефон и кладет его рядом с поверженными фигурами врага. Я не выдерживаю, прошу разрешения тоже сыграть одну партию. Они приветливо соглашаются, угощают меня виноградам и сигаретами – грузинским священникам почему-то не возбраняется курить.......




.....«Неотъемлемой частью тогдашнего Тбилиси был городской сумасшедший Кика. Маленький плотный человечек с болезнью Дауна. Дело было в 60-е, в дни совместного визита в Тбилиси Никиты Хрущева и Фиделя Кастро. На проспекте вдруг появился Кика. Кто-то усмехнулся, кто-то его поприветствовал. И все бы этим закончилось, если бы вдруг на улице не появился второй по известности "районный сумасшедший", высокий брюнет с длинной бородой - ну прямо как у вождя кубинской революции. Мгновенно поставили Кику с "Фиделем" рядом; маленький плотненький лысый Кика и без такого соседства мог рождать кукурузные ассоциации, а эти два человека рядом... ну просто нарочно не придумаешь! В те годы по Тбилиси еще ходили открытые такси. Таксисту всучили деньги, поставили обоих сумасшедших в машину, вручили "Фиделю" папиросу (за неимением гаванских сигар), а Кике - тут же снятую с кого-то шляпу. Таксист медленно тронулся, за машиной пошла огромная толпа людей. Весь район был на улице, люди высыпали на подъездов и магазинов и все как один шли за машиной. Оба сумасшедших стояли в ней, махали руками и были счастливы от такого внимания к себе (ведь и они были тбилисцами!). Машины, ехавшие в противоположную сторону, сигналили, из них высовывались люди и приветствовали процессию. И тут произошло невероятное: молодой милиционер-регулировщик на перекрестке "не выдержал ситуации" и козырнул машине с "вождями", чем вызвал еще один взрыв ликования у публики. Один знакомый работал в те годы в милиции и рассказывал, что когда Кику потом в участке спрашивали "кто это все организовал?",..........

.......Эти полуразрушенные дома, в которых люди продолжают жить, пока, скажем, не рухнет стена, несут в себе больше информации о судьбе Тбилиси, чем любой учебник истории. Например, в одном из них, в древнем районе Сололаки, на стене изображено распятие, под ним – всадник на коне, а рядом – какая-то воинственная дама с ребенком в одной руке и кинжалом в другой. Поверх этого натянуты веревки, висят ковры и какие-то носки. «Это вы нарисовали?» – спрашиваю я хозяев, уже понимая, что вряд ли: фреска явно не новая и штукатурка, на которую нанесен рисунок, наполовину осыпалась. «Да нет, что вы! Мы сюда недавно переехали. Мы армяне, а раньше здесь жил курд. Он был солнцепоклонник и писал картины. Вот видите – это курдская богоматерь! Она сражается за свой народ». Что за курдская богоматерь? С кем она сражается? Если солцепоклонник, то почему распятие? Хозяева дома плохо говорят по-русски, да если бы и говорили, то все равно объяснить бы не смогли – в этом городе, где все перемешалось, переплелись разные религии и эпохи, дома помнят лучше, чем люди.



Читаите полную статью здесь